

REMARKS

Claims 1, 4-9, 11, 35, and 37-42 were pending as of the action mailed on August 11, 2008. Amendments to independent claims 1 and 35 and amendments to dependent claims 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 37, 38, 41, and 42 are being submitted. Dependent claims 59 and 60 are being added.

Reexamination of the application and reconsideration of the action are respectfully requested in light of the following remarks.

I. Claim Objections

Claims 1 and 35 were objected to because of the informality of the term “that snippet.” The amendments have rendered this objection moot. Withdrawal of the objection is requested.

II. Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

The examiner rejected claims 35 and 37-42 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, stating that “the claims fail to place the invention squarely within one statutory class of invention” (Office Action mailed August 11, 2008 at page 2). Claim 35 has been amended to recite a “computer program product embodied on a computer-readable storage device.” No new matter has been added; support can be found in the originally filed specification at paragraphs 53 and 55. Withdrawal of the rejection is requested.

III. Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 112

The examiner rejected claim 42 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, stating that “[t]here is insufficient antecedent basis for... [“the search result document link”] in the claim” (Office Action at page 3). Claim 42 has been amended to conform to the amendment to claim 35, and this rejection is now moot. Withdrawal of the rejection is requested.

IV. Rejection of Claims 1 and 35 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103

Claims 1 and 35 were rejected as being allegedly obvious over Hennings (U.S. Pat. No. 6,763,496) in view of Cupps (U.S. Pat. No. 5,991,739). Claims 1 and 35 have been amended in order to distinguish over Hennings and Cupps. Support can be found in the originally filed specification at paragraphs 2, 4, 7, 31, 40, 43, 50, and 51, and in originally filed claims 1 and 2.

The combination of Hennings and Cupps does not disclose, teach, or suggest generating “two or more search results in response to the search query” as recited in claim 1. The examiner relies on the homepage 100 of Hennings as a “search result.” In particular, the examiner cites to Hennings at FIG. 2 and col. 6, ll. 10-30 and 47-55 and notes on pages 3-4 of the Office Action that Hennings teaches “displaying a homepage 100 as a result in response to a user request.” Displaying a homepage, however, only provides one page; thus the homepage 100 of Hennings cannot be the claimed “two or more search results in response to the query.”

Second, the combination of Hennings and Cupps also does not disclose, teach, or suggest the claimed “query-relevant snippet, the query-relevant snippet being text extracted from the corresponding search result document” for each search result as recited in claim 1. The examiner relies on the same portion of Hennings as cited above for disclosing this limitation. This teaching of Hennings, however, only describes common HTML linking, and the described hyperlink is not a “query-relevant snippet, the query-relevant snippet being text extracted from the corresponding search result document.” There is no teaching in Hennings as to how hyperlinks are “query-relevant.” Indeed, hyperlinks are not query-relevant, as they would be the same each time the homepage 100 is loaded. Thus, there is no teaching in Hennings of the claimed “query-relevant snippet, the query-relevant snippet being text extracted from the corresponding search result document.”

Third, the combination of Hennings and Cupps does not disclose, teach, or suggest the claimed navigation “directly to a portion of the respective query-relevant snippet within the corresponding search result document when the query-relevant snippet is selected by a user from the display of the corresponding search result on the client device” as recited in claim 1. The examiner cites to Hennings at Fig. 2, col. 6, ll. 47-55 as disclosing such navigation, and notes on

page 4 of the Office Action that Hennings teaches that “clicking on either icon 104 or text hyperlink anchor 112 will link the browser to Cruises page 118.” This teaching of Hennings, however, only describes common linking providing by HTML, and there is no teaching of navigating “directly to a portion of each respective query-relevant snippet within the corresponding search result document when the query-relevant snippet is selected by a user.” Instead, the only teaching of Hennings is that a webpage is provided in response to selecting a link on the homepage 100.

Claim 35 has been similarly amended to overcome Hennings and Cupps, and thus the arguments above apply to claim 35 as well. For each of these reasons, allowance of claims 1 and 35, and all claims depending therefore, is requested.

V. Conclusion

The allowability of all of the pending claims has been addressed. The absence of a reply to a specific rejection, issue, or comment does not signify agreement with or concession of that rejection, issue, or comment. In addition, because the arguments made above may not be exhaustive, there may be reasons for patentability of any or all pending claims (or other claims) that have not been expressed. Finally, nothing in this paper should be construed as an intent to concede any issue with regard to any claim, except as specifically stated in this paper, and the amendment or cancellation of any claim does not necessarily signify concession of unpatentability of the claim prior to its amendment or cancellation.


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Respectfully submitted,

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